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INTEGRATION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE A & P
COMPANY: A REPLY
PRICE POLICY IN THE A & P CASE
M. A. ADELMANt
It is impossible, in what must be a brief note, to do justice to an
article recently appearing in this Journal.1 But a representative sample
is its discussion of sales and price policy as an issue in the A & P case.
According to the prosecution briefs, prices must be set equal to cost at
an uneconomic low volume, plus a markup. For it was illegal to cut
prices in order to attract more volume " . . 'to the point where the ex-
pense rate was low enough to permit the store to operate at a profit.'
We know of no more clear and concise words with which to express the
Government's charge."2
This is the way the Antitrust Division repeatedly posed, the issue.
Despite a few (probably sincere) avowals that they really favored com-
petition, there is only one way to characterize this doctrine: "a direct
attack on the competitive process." 3 Here is the way Dirlam and Kahn
meet this rather serious allegation: "Admittedly, there are isolated
phrases in the government's brief in the District Court Case-a docu-
ment of over 1,000 pages-that appear to advocate cost-plus pricing;
and similar inferences may be drawn from isolated statements in the
decisions." 4
And this is the complete refutation made by the authors. Note the
implication of mere "phrases" when there were actually complete state-
ments and whole paragraphs. Note also the implication (of sober second
thought?) that such statements do not appear in the Circuit Court brief-
which, in fact, they do. Dirlam and Kahn do not claim that the state-
ments have been given a meaning contrary to what they had in the orig-
inal context. They do not even make the weaker claim that these state-
f Associate Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1. Dirlam and Kahn, Integration and Dissolution of The 4 & P Company, 29 IND.
L.J. 1 (1953). All references will be to this article unless otherwise noted.
2. Gov't Brief 110, United States v. The New York Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
3. Note, Trouble Begins in the "New" Sherman Act: The Perplexing Story of the
A & P Case, 58 YALE L.. 969, 977 (1949). And see Adelman, The 4 & P Case: A
Study in Applied Economic Theory, 53 Q.J. EcoN. 238 (1949).
4. P. 21 n.78.
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ments could somehow be given another and less antisocial interpretation.
Rather, they simply ignore them.
What do Dirlam and Kahn take to be the issue? They state it as
selling below costs in selected areas, 5 "unreasonable or predatory" price
cutting, 6 and in their peroration (with their italics), the "intention .. .
to eliminate competitors by discriminatory sharpshooting in selling."7 At
no point are we told what this means.
We can only pause to wonder why two economists would never
think it necessary to show how predatory competition-to eliminate or
browbeat competitors and then raise prices-could ever possibly succeed
in an industry where entry is so cheap and easy. Predatory competition
is an expensive pastime, undertaken only if monopoly and its fruits can
be obtained and held." One might also ask the chances of a "reasonable
and prudent" A & P management not knowing this, or of a reasonable
or at least not completely insane A & P management, knowing (by the
chain store taxes, the Robinson-Patman and Miller-Tydings Acts, and
their state kindred) of the political power of the retailers, trying to
"eliminate competitors."
But *hat is the evidence of this intent "to eliminate competitors by
discriminatory sharpshooting in selling"? When there is a lot of sharp-
shooting, a lot of people are bound to get shot. The case covered eighteen
years, and there was an average of over ten thousand stores operated at
any moment, or roughly 200,000 store-years. Even a limited, temporary,
ineffective, predatory campaign would give us hundreds of thousands of
victims. Where are they? Despite "numerous instances" of threats or
attempts to "put specific rivals out of business," Dirlam and Kahn prefer
not to say "how typical these tactics were or how many rivals actually were
bankrupted" because the government's cases "are not convincing on this
score."9 So for years on end there was an intent "to eliminate competi-
tors," yet there is no convincing evidence. To paraphrase Winston
Churchill: Some elimination! Some intent!
Furthermore, "the A & P record is devoid of evidence drawing a
clear line of causation from illegal practices to an increasing market
share.... But there is also no doubt that A & P's discriminatory tactics,
5. P. 17 n.59.
6. P. 18.
7. P. 21.
8. See WILCOX, COMPEMTION AND MONOPOLY IN AM EUCAN INDUSTRY 57 (TNEC
Monograph No. 21, 1940), on the chances of holding a monopoly here. See also Cassady
& Grether, Local Price Differentials in the Western Retail Grocery Trade, 21 HARv.
Bus. REv. 190, 205-206 (1943).
9. P. 19 n.70 and accompanying text.
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in... selling, must have contributed to these high market shares .... 10
There is no evidence, but there is also no doubt. It "must" have hap-
pened.
Let us, therefore, take Dirlam and Kahn's own leading example of
these tactics: the Boston Unit of A & P which lost money during 1934-
1939. They tell us of "the low margins which produced these losses ...
[because] A & P wanted to increase its share of the market."' 1 It was
"a deliberate pricing policy, resulting in the inadequate gross profit
rate.'1 2 Now for the actual facts, easily available in the A & P record
and incredibly absent from the article. During five of those six years,
the "low" and "inadequate" Boston gross profit rate was higher than the
Company average. Naturally, the Boston Unit lost part of their market
share during this time, and naturally, too, they lost money. Starting in
1940, after prolonged needling from higher up, Boston was able to get
that "low" and "inadequate" gross profit rate down as low as (and then
even lower than) the rest of the Company, whereupon they immediately
began making money again and increasing their market share.' 3 This
was in miniature the whole process of cutting prices to increase volume,
lower expenses, and raise profits which the government attacked. Since
they ignore the voluminous documentation and statistics, small wonder
that Dirlam and Kahn ignore the government charge. To them, a pro-
gram aimed at higher profits and involving the risk of loss is a planned
loss. 14
This strategy of lower prices was profitable partly because of
A & P's greater efficiency and lower cost than its rivals. Dirlam and
Kahn never mention the repeated and considered opinions of A & P ex-
ecutives around 1940-1941, for intra-Company consideration only, that
A & P operating expenses and gross margins were well below those of
any competitor. 15 But one need not stop there. For the years 1939-1943,
despite an expensive conversion to supermarkets through 1941 and an
unfavorable wartime position, A & P's expense rate averaged 12.7 per-
cent of gross sales; the gross profit rate averaged 14.7 percent. An OPA
compilation shows that no group of chains came within four percentage
points of matching that expense rate. (This excludes the group of which
10. P. 20.
11. Pp. 18-19.
12. P. 19 n.64 (italics added).
13. Boston gross profit rates are in Gov't Exhibit 314, United States v. New York
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
14. This statement is literally true. Compare p. 19 n.64 with Adelman, supra note 3,
at 241-242.
15. Gov't Exhibits 225, 226, 236; Defendants' Exhibit 143, United States v. New
York Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
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A & P itself constituted more than half."6 ) In making their compari-
sons, Dirlam and Kahn disregard this evidence. Instead, they follow the
astounding procedure of comparing the A & P gross profit rate for 1943
with postwar estimates for other chains. This despite the tremendous
postwar inflation of food prices and the consequent shrinkage in the per-
cent allocable to marketing margins. Further comment on this statistical
procedure would be superfluous.
Perhaps Dirlam and Kahn will now favor us with some striking
definition of "intent" and "eliminate" which will not lack the charm of
novelty and will follow from any set of facts-or the absence thereof.
The reader will need to judge this, and the original article, for himself.
16. OPA, EcoNoMIc DATA SmiuEs No. 20, tables 1-8 (1947).
